



# Sentenced to Death:

## Testing the relationship between country instability and subnational assassinations

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### Introduction

- Research initially sought to uncover relationship between terrorist ideologies and assassinations.
- Given data constraints, among other factors, this research transitioned to understanding causes of subnational assassinations. Subnational assassinations are those that are including not just presidents and prime ministers as in national assassinations, but also referring to mayors, businessmen, lawyers, police officers, etc.
- This project is an exploratory analytical study of the relationship between political instability and the tactics of terrorism.


### So What?

- This research is important because researchers and practitioners have only looked into the assassinations of presidents and prime ministers, leaving out the sub-national assassinations.
- These assassinations are more common and are understudied.

### Methodology

H<sub>1</sub>: Interstate Wars → Number of Assassinations

- This study employs a time-series analysis using a negative binomial regression with fixed effects.
- The variables that were used in this analysis were hypothesized to have an impact on political violence and subnational attacks.



### Results




Fig. 1: Regime Type and Number of Assassinations Chart

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	num_assass~s	num_assass~s	num_assass~s
num_assass~s			
internalco~t	0.947*** (23.61)	0.672*** (10.06)	0.613*** (8.89)
polity2		0.0638*** (14.53)	0.0538*** (11.43)
theta_mean		-0.0321 (-1.10)	-0.0948*** (-2.91)
ethfrac		-0.512*** (-4.16)	-0.368*** (-2.78)
relfrac		0.166 (0.97)	0.190 (0.99)
coldwar		-0.241*** (-5.06)	-0.0782 (-1.55)
ln_gdp_per~a			0.148*** (8.72)
ln_emp			0.0585 (1.44)
cinc			-1.700 (-0.71)
_cons	-1.638*** (-65.81)	-0.883*** (-11.65)	-2.166*** (-12.85)
N	9121	3980	3547
AIC	33287.8	16237.0	15144.9

Fig. 3: Negative Binomial Regression with Internal Conflict Variable




Fig. 2: Time-Series Analysis: Years and Number of Assassinations

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	num_assass~s	num_assass~s	num_assass~s
num_assass~s			
polity2	0.0509*** (14.51)	0.0747*** (13.39)	0.0656*** (10.72)
theta_mean		-0.0805** (-2.28)	-0.167*** (-4.04)
ethfrac		-0.148 (-0.89)	0.139 (0.77)
relfrac		-0.134 (-0.64)	-0.299 (-1.25)
coldwar		-0.101* (-1.71)	0.0711 (1.15)
ln_gdp_per~a			0.161*** (7.46)
ln_emp			-0.0511 (-0.98)
cinc			2.525 (0.95)
_cons	-1.271*** (-39.97)	-0.793*** (-8.54)	-2.018*** (-9.81)
N	5983	3170	2782
AIC	18930.2	10277.7	9435.6

Fig. 4: Negative Binomial Regression without Internal Conflict Variable

### Analysis

Fig. 1

- Increase in number of assassinations as the polity2 score gets closer to 10 (a fully democratic regime)

Fig. 2

- Increase in number of assassinations in more recent years

**Negative Binomial Regression Models**  
 Model 1: Internal Conflict  
 Model 2: Including Political Variables  
 Model 3: Including Economic Variables

Fig. 3

- There is a strong relationship with internal conflicts and the number of assassinations
- Statistically Significant Variables:
  - Internal Conflict
  - Regime Type
  - Human Rights (reduce)
  - Ethnic Fractionalization (reduce)
  - Gross Domestic Product

Fig. 4

- As a comparative study, countries involved in either no conflict or interstate conflicts were examined to determine their relationship with the number of assassinations
- Statistically Significant Variables:
  - Regime Type
  - Human Rights (reduce)
  - Gross Domestic Product

### Future Research

- Joint Academic Publication
- Completing a Weibull analysis will uncover if conflicts with higher numbers of assassinations will affect the duration
- Simultaneous regression equation will further confirm these results. Will prove that internal conflicts lead to an increased number of assassinations, instead of the inverse.

### References

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